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We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed popula-
tion of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non
contingent mobility in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We find that cooperative behav-
ior is not only possible but may even be enhanced by such an “always-move” rule, when compared
with the strongly viscous (“never-move”) case. In addition, mobility also increases the capability of
cooperation to emerge and invade a population of defectors, what may have a fundamental role in
the problem of the onset of cooperation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The onset and sustainability of cooperation in social
and non social populations is still an open and chal-
lenging problem [3, 7, 26, 35, 48] that has been tackled
with tools from different fields, ranging from psychologi-
cal and social sciences to statistical physics. Although
involving a cost to the performer, cooperative behav-
ior is ubiquitous in biological populations. Even more
tantalizing is its presence in groups of extremely simple
individuals [5, 14, 16, 17, 18, 36, 43, 51, 54, 55, 57],
where a mechanism other than direct or indirect reci-
procity due to memory of previous encounters or kin-
ship relations should apply. Indeed, cooperative behav-
ior is found to occur when dispersal is very limited (high
viscosity), what increases the probability of future en-
counters among close neighbors (the so called shadow of
the future), albeit decreasing the propagation rate of the
strategies. Axelrod [3] was perhaps the first to consider
the effects of territoriality in the spread of strategies in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see definition below), ei-
ther by colonization or imitation, but without explicit
migration. Differently from the standard, random mix-
ing population, spatial localization allows a continuing
interaction within the local neighborhood. The reasons
for this are manyfold: individuals usually occupy well-
defined territorial regions, they do not move far from
their places of birth (population viscosity [21]), interac-
tions occur in places where animals usually meet such
as water ponds, etc. That preliminary study was later
extended by Nowak and May [39, 42] who showed that
geographical fixation enhances the probability of further
interaction in such a way that even simple nice rules like
unconditional cooperation are able to survive. In these
structured populations, cooperative strategies can build
clusters in which the benefits of mutual cooperation can
outweight losses against defectors, maintaining the popu-
lation of cooperators stable. These spatial games, where
the interactions are localized and non random, have been
studied and extended in many ways (see, for example,
Refs. [1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 15, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 34,
37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52]). Once the popula-
tion is spatially structured, a natural question concerns
the effects of mobility that, along with other important
biological factors, is often neglected [28]: is it possible
to evolve and sustain cooperation in a population of mo-
bile agents, where retaliation can be avoided by mov-
ing away from the former partner? In particular, do we
need explicit assortment, contingent movements or any
behaviorally complex strategy, or is it possible to have
a finite density of unconditional cooperators with unbi-
ased, random mobility? By increasing the effective range
of interactions, the introduction of mobility increases the
random mixing and gets the system closer to the mean
field situation, in which every agent interacts randomly
with the whole population, and defection is known to
prevail. Thus, one might naively think that by dissipat-
ing the shadow of the future, mobility becomes a limiting
factor for cooperation.
Here we provide some insight on this issue by explic-
itly considering individual random diffusion in the frame-
work of a locally, non randomly interacting spatial game,
where simple, memoryless, strategy-pure agents coexist.
This is important as it helps to settle the minimal con-
ditions under which cooperative behavior might emerge.
Although there is no simple answer to the above question
since motion can both destroy and enhance the altruistic
behavior, we show that there are broad conditions under
which even a blind pattern of mobility, without anticipat-
ing the future neighborhood (no assortment) and without
2considering the accumulated payoff, may have a positive
effect in the amount of cooperation. In other words, al-
though mobility decreases the shadow of the future for
nearest neighbors by diminishing the probability of a fu-
ture encounter, it also increases it for more distant ones,
that may now be visited.
Dugatkin and Wilson [8] and Enquist and Leimar [11]
showed that a randomly interacting population of fixed
cooperators (playing Tit-for-Tat, TFT) could be invaded
by mobile defectors that avoid retaliation by moving in
search of new cooperators to exploit. Mobility was intro-
duced as a cost to wander between patches without spa-
tial structure, not as an explicit diffusive process. By let-
ting both mobility and cooperative traits evolve together,
Koella [32] (see also Ref. [20, 33, 53]) obtained low dis-
persive altruists and highly dispersive egoists which en-
hanced the stability of local clusters. Again, there was no
explicit diffusive behavior as mobility was introduced by
generating offspring within a given dispersal range. Dif-
fusion was considered by Ferrie`re and Michod [12, 13] by
including a diffusive term in the replicator equation [27].
Two strategies, TFT and unconditional defection (D),
were allowed to move in a one dimensional system with
local, non random interactions, mobility again involving
a cost. This system may sustain cooperation when both
strategies have a minimum mobility, and retaliation by
TFTs was found to be an important ingredient. More
recently, Aktipis [2] considered contingent movement of
cooperators: once a defection occurred in the previous
movement, they walk away. This win-stay, lose-move
strategy can invade a population of defectors and resists
further invasions. Hamilton and Taborsky [20] and Le
Galliard et al. [33] (and Koella [32] as well) considered
the coevolution of mobility and cooperation traits. How-
ever, both models are a kind of mean field approach as
there is no spatial structure and interactions are random.
Models with alternating viscosities, reflecting different
stages of development that benefit both from the clus-
terization of cooperators and dispersal, have also been
considered [50, 56], showing that local competition for
resources balances the benefits of kinship cooperation,
inhibiting cooperation. The present work differs from all
these in several aspects: we consider non random inter-
actions on a two-dimensional structure, mobility traits
do not evolve and movements are Brownian, non con-
tingent, and not under the control of the agents, both
strategies considered are simple, unconditional and non
retaliating, with no memory of previous steps. In other
words, we are considering the simplest possible scenario
for cooperation.
We addressed in earlier work [52] the question of the
robustness of cooperation in spatial games in the presence
of heterogeneous environments. By introducing quenched
disorder in the lattice (random dilution) each individual
would sense a locally varying social environment as the
number of neighbors becomes site dependent: optimal
cooperation can be achieved for weak disorder as the de-
fects (or inaccessible regions) act as pinning fields for the
strategy transition waves that cross the system, keeping
the clusters of cooperators more protected from invasions.
Thus, an irregular landscape may enhance cooperation
by introducing natural defenses against invasions of de-
fectors. Now we allow this disorder to be annealed: the
vacant sites are no longer fixed and may become occupied
by a neighbor agent with a probability that depends on
the populational viscosity. Only random, unbiased diffu-
sion is considered here, although extensions to contingent
rules may be also devised. The detailed outcome of the
game will depend on the precise implementation of the
dynamics. For example, the order in which combats, off-
spring generation and diffusion occur leads to qualitative
differences in the population.
II. THE SPATIAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is the archetypal model
for reciprocal altruism. In any round, each of the two
players either cooperates (C) or defects (D), without
knowledge of the opponent’s strategy. The result depends
on the mutual choice and is given by the payoff matrix
whose elements are: a reward R (punishment P ) if both
cooperate (defect), S (sucker’s payoff) and T (tempta-
tion) if one cooperates and the other defects, respectively.
Moreover, these quantities should satisfy the inequalities
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. In a random mating,
infinite population of asexual (haploid) elements, where
two pure strategies are present (cooperators C and defec-
torsD), defecting will be the most rewarding strategy, in-
dependently of the opponent’s choice. Nonetheless, more
complex rules (with memory of previous encounters) have
been devised [3] if the agents are to meet again in the fu-
ture. Here we will take a simplified version of the payoff
matrix [42]: R = 1, P = S = 0 and T = b > 1, reduc-
ing the matrix to only one free parameter. Initially, an
equal number of cooperators and defectors are randomly
placed on a two dimensional square lattice of length size
L and periodic boundary conditions, such that the total
density is ρ. Each individual combats with all its four
closest neighbors (if any), accumulates the correspond-
ing payoff and then may either move or try to generate
its offspring. In the reproduction step, each player com-
pares its total payoff with the ones of its neighbors and
changes strategy, following the one with the greatest pay-
off among them. This strategy changing updating rule
preserves the total amount of individuals, thus keeping
ρ constant. Results, averaged over 30-130 samples, are
shown for L = 100 and b = 1.4, where the original model
(ρ = 1) is known to sustain cooperation along with a
finite fraction of strategy changing, active sites. As men-
tioned in the introduction, different values of ρ can be
used to mimic heterogeneous environments by allowing
the number of connections to vary from site to site due
to dilution [52].
There are several ways of implementing an unbiased
random walk along with the PD interactions. Here
3we consider two possibilities, named combat-offspring-
diffusion (COD) and combat-diffusion-offspring (CDO).
In the former, as the name says, each step consists of
combats followed by the generation of offspring done in
parallel, and then diffusion, while in the later, the diffu-
sion and offspring steps are reversed. During the diffusive
step, each agent makes an attempt to jump to a site cho-
sen randomly within its four nearest neighbours, what
is accepted, provided the site is empty, with a probabil-
ity m. Here we only consider local steps with a reduced
dispersal range (one lattice site), m thus measuring the
mobility of the agents (m = 0 reduces to the case studied
in [52]).
III. RESULTS
Figs. 1 and 2, where the average temporal evolution of
the cooperators density ρ
c
is shown for different values
of the viscosity parameter m, exemplify the rich behav-
ior presented by the model once mobility is introduced.
Under thinning or thickening, the ultimate fate of a pop-
ulation depends on the total density (and probably on
the initial state), as is exemplified in these figures: while
in the COD dynamics of fig. 1 the asymptotic density of
cooperators decreases as m increases, in the CDO case of
fig. 2, on the contrary, ρ
c
may increase with m for some
values of ρ. The short time behavior is similar in both
cases: the density of cooperators initially decreases since
they are not yet coordinated (the initial state is random)
forming only small groups, what does not prevent the
exploitation by neighboring defectors.
Fig. 3, for COD dynamics, shows both the density
of cooperators and strategy-changing individuals (active
sites, ρ
a
), as a function of the total lattice occupation ρ,
after the system attained a stationary state where both
quantities fluctuate around their average values. Also
shown, for comparison, are the results from [52] for the
extremely viscous case m = 0. Cooperation only ap-
pears above a minimum, m-dependent, density; below
this point, defectors dominate (ρ
c
= 0). At low densities,
any mobility destroys cooperation (ρ
c
= 0): for m = 0,
isolated all-cooperating clusters are able to survive, but
as soon as m > 0 the existence of free riders will invade
these small clusters. Although cooperation is possible
for large mobilities (e.g., m = 1), cooperators perform
better when nobody moves, ρ
c
(m = 0) > ρ
c
(m = 1),
for all ρ. Interestingly, for intermediate values of the
mobility (e.g., m = 0.1) cooperation is enhanced when
compared with the viscous case: for a broad range of
densities, ρ
c
(m = 0.1) > ρ
c
(m = 0). Thus, two immedi-
ate conclusions are: first, cooperation is possible in the
presence of mobility when the available space is some-
what reduced and, second, intermediate mobilities en-
hance cooperation! Indeed, for intermediate mobilities,
there is a maximum in the fraction of cooperators (e.g.,
for m = 0.1, the maximum occurs at ρ ≃ 0.75), differ-
ently from the m = 1 case where this maximum occurs
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FIG. 1: Average fraction of cooperators ρc/ρ as a function of
time for several values of m for the COD dynamics at ρ = 0.7
in a semi-log plot. In all cases there is an initial decrease
in the cooperators density since cooperators are not yet co-
ordinated and only form small groups, being easily predated.
Depending on the mobility, at later times the existing cooper-
ator clusters may either disappear or grow, leading to extinc-
tion or a stable, mixed population, respectively. For values of
m & 0.33, mobility leads to extinction of cooperation, even if
sometimes very slowly. Indeed, close to the transition point,
the extinction time seems to diverge. On the other hand,
for low mobility, m . 0.33, after the initial decrease com-
mon to all values of m, cooperation resumes and a plateau is
attained at intermediate values of ρc, with cooperators and
defectors coexisting. Notice also that for m = 0, ρc/ρ ≃ 0.2
(not shown) [52]: the behavior, for m = 0 and m → 0+, is
quite different.
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FIG. 2: Average fraction of cooperators ρc/ρ as a function
of time for ρ = 0.24 and several values of m for the CDO
dynamics near the transition from an all-D to an all-C phase.
Analogously to fig. 1, after the common initial decrease in
the amount of cooperation, at late times the existing coop-
erator clusters may either disappear or increase their sizes,
depending on the mobility m. On the other hand, in this case
cooperators may fully invade the population and ρc = ρ.
4at ρ = 1, where no movement is allowed. The tran-
sition from the region with ρ
c
= 0 to the cooperative
one seems to be continuous and the finite fraction of ac-
tive sites indicates that when ρ
c
6= 0, both strategies, C
and D, coexist. Remarkably, the fall of cooperation af-
ter the maximum seems not to be associated with any
particular behavior of active sites, whose fraction keeps
growing with the total density. Thus, although no par-
ticular sign is observed in ρ
a
around the maximum of ρ
c
,
the decrease of cooperation after the maximum is related
to a smaller number of empty sites that act as pinning
points that slow the dynamics or even prevent that some
regions of cooperators be predated, as was observed in
[52]. Fig. 4 shows the fraction of cooperators as a func-
tion ofm for two different densities, 0.7 and 0.9. For both
densities, mobility decreases cooperation, and in the for-
mer, even destroys it completely above a threshold (close
to it, the relaxation becomes too slow and longer runs
should be performed in order to decide whether the tran-
sition is continuous or not). Both cases also differ on the
role played by the active sites, much more prominent for
ρ = 0.9 because the smaller the number of empty sites
(pinning points), the larger the number of active sites.
Fig. 5 presents the long time behavior of the density
of cooperators shown in fig. 2 for the CDO dynamics, as
a function of the total lattice occupation ρ, along with
the fraction of active sites ρ
a
. Again, the overall picture
remains the same: mobility destroys cooperation for low
densities, while enhances it for higher densities. This ef-
fect is even stronger here than in the COD case: besides
occuring in a wider range of ρ (compare figs. 3 and 5), co-
operators can invade completely the population (ρ
c
= ρ,
for some ρ, in fig. 5 and ρ
c
< ρ, for all ρ, in fig. 3). Also,
when compared with the viscous m = 0 case, this dy-
namics outperforms it, except very close to ρ = 1. The
origin of the difference between CDO and COD dynamics
is that, wheneverm 6= 0, it is always good for the cooper-
ators to move away from its partner, whatever its strat-
egy, what favors the CDO dynamics. Differently from the
previous case, here there are two transitions: a sharp one
from a D-dominated (ρ
c
= 0) to a C-dominated (ρ
c
= ρ),
followed by a continuous one to an active phase (both
strategies coexist and ρ
a
6= 0). Moreover, for a given
ρ, the dependence on mobility is more complex than the
previous case, as shown in the inset of Fig. 4: for large
densities, the behavior is analogous to the COD dynam-
ics, while the behavior for intermediate densities is un-
expected, as the system passes from an all-D to an all-C
state as m increases. Although we do not deal in this
paper with the question of invadability of a population
by a different strategy, we present in Fig. 6, an exam-
ple of when an initial patch with only two cooperators
completely replaces the sea of defectors in which they
are immersed. Again, in this case the mobility enhances
the effect (unless the density is so high that movements
are prevented), and the larger m is, the greater is the
probability of cooperators to invade the population. In
comparison, this has a very small probability of happen-
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FIG. 3: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc/ρ and
active sites ρa/ρ (inset) for the COD dynamics and different
values of the mobility, from m = 0 (solid line) to 1. Different
from the CDO case (see Fig. 5), here there is not a defector-
free phase (ρc/ρ is always lower than 1) at intermediate densi-
ties, although their presence is reduced. For small mobilities
(smaller than 0.5 in the figure) there is an optimal density
where the relative amount of cooperators is maximized. This
maximum increases as m decreases. Notice that as soon as
there are cooperators, there are also active sites: there is no
frozen mixed configurations in this case. Thus, as was ex-
emplified in fig. 1, for a fixed density, a very tiny mobility is
usually the best scenario at intermediate densities. For small
and high values of ρ, the viscous, “never-move” case performs
better. In particular, the m = 1 always has less cooperators
than the immobile case (m = 0). In the inset, the correspond-
ing fraction of active sites are plotted: the mixed state where
Cs and Ds coexist is also an active phase. Differently from
the m = 0 case, mobility, even if in small amounts, helps to
unpin the strategy-flipping waves that roam the system.
ing when m ≃ 0.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
High population viscosity, or very limited dispersal
(low mobility), is a possible mechanism for the emergence
and maintenance of cooperation, even in a population of
very simple, non-retaliating, strategy-pure, agents [42].
The cluster organization prevents defectors from com-
pletely overtaking the population because the payoff from
the bulk cooperators outwin the exploitation at the bor-
ders. A fundamental problem consists in obtaining the
minimal conditions under which cooperation is present
in a population. In particular, in this paper, we tried
to shed some light in the role of mobility, a usually ne-
glected factor. On one hand, besides helping to spread
clusters of cooperators, mobility may allow defectors to
escape retaliation from a former partner and helps to in-
crease the random mixing of a population by increasing
the range of interaction. Once memoryless agents are
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FIG. 4: Average fraction of cooperating individuals (empty
symbols) and active sites (filled symbols) for the COD dy-
namics and densities ρ = 0.7 (squares) and 0.9 (circles). For
comparison, the values of ρc/ρ for m = 0 are: 0.2 (ρ = 0.7)
and 0.52 (ρ = 0.9). For all values of ρ, the amount of co-
operation is a decreasing function of the mobility. Whether
cooperative behavior exist depends, however, on the value of
ρ: while for ρ = 0.9 cooperators exist in the whole region, for
ρ = 0.7 a critical value of m (around 0.33) exists above which
defectors dominate. In analogy with some physical systems,
the dynamics close to this point slows down and long time
simulations are needed in order to extract the correct loca-
tion and order of the transition. Inset: the same as above
but for the CDO dynamics. Notice that in this case, the co-
operation increases with m for some values of ρ (e.g., 0.24,
squares), and decreases for others (0.8, circles).
considered (no recognition process is involved), the prob-
ability of future encounters (the so called shadow of the
future) increases when the mobility is small, and spatial
correlations are strong. Moreover, when increasing the
mobility, the effective range of interactions increases pro-
portionally to it and the probability of sharing the same
opponent decreases, thus dissipating the shadow of the
future. In this case, defection is expected. On the other
hand, contingent mobility is expected to enhance cooper-
ation by avoiding continued exploitation or defector rich
regions. In between, when diffusion is unbiased and the
strategies, unconditional, it is not obvious what would be
the effect of mobility.
Here we presented results for a simple spatial game
where the patched environment allows explicit, although
random, movement of agents whose strategies are pure,
non retaliating (unconditional). The diffusion is brown-
ian, not relying on any type of explicit, genotypic or phe-
notypic assortment. Moreover, in our model there is no
correlation between mobility and altruism: all rules are
equally mobile. Whether a given strategy is able or not
to invade another population would strongly depend on
how viscous a population is, the global density and the
chosen dynamics. However, some universal conclusions
can be stated. First of all, cooperation is possible under
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FIG. 5: Average fraction of cooperating individuals, ρc/ρ
(squares), and active sites (circles), ρa/ρ, for the CDO dy-
namics and several values of the mobility: m = 0 (solid line),
1 (hollow symbols) and 0.1 (filled symbols). Notice the three
regimes: defector dominated (ρc = 0, at low ρ), coopera-
tor dominated (ρc = 1, at intermediate ρ) and a mixed one
(0 < ρc < 1, at greater values of ρ). They are separated by
two transitions, discontinuous and continuous, respectively.
Notice also that active sites, those that change strategy at a
given time, have non neglectable densities only at large den-
sities (roughly above ρ ≃ 0.7), where there is a mixed phase
with both strategies coexisting (0 < ρc < ρ). Again, in anal-
ogy with the COD case, mobility enhances cooperation for
intermediate values of densities. However, higher mobilities
increase the range of ρ of the all-C phase.
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FIG. 6: Probability of invasion of a population of defectors by
cooperators, as a function of ρ, when an initial patch with two
cooperators is immersed in a whole population of defectors.
We consider several values of m and CDO dynamics. Notice
that the larger the mobility is, the greater is the probability
of invasion. This effect is absent in the corresponding viscous
case (m = 0), where this small patch is not enough for invasion
to occur.
6the above conditions, thus enlarging the limits for coop-
erative behavior. Second, for a broad range of the param-
eters (density, viscosity, etc), cooperation is enhanced in
respect to the viscous case. Third, a rule like always-
move, regardless of the opponent strategy, may increase
the capability of cooperators to invade and overtake a
population of defectors. In this sense, mobility may have
a fundamental role in the problem of the onset of coop-
eration. Once mobility is incorporated within a popu-
lation, it may evolve to more contingent forms, perhaps
under the control of the agents, and be strategy, payoff or
partner dependent. A possible realization of such diffu-
sion scenario may occur in organisms with extracellular
metabolism, as is the case of some yeast cells [17]. Sugar
is processed outside the cell by a secreted enzyme called
invertase, creating a common resource for all surrounding
cells. This offers the opportunity for defection as some
cells may not have the cost of producing the enzyme but
yet benefit from that produced by others. To what extent
the cooperative behavior observed in such simple organ-
isms is a sole effect of the underlying spatial structure or
whether there is an enhancement factor due to diffusion is
an open and interesting question. Moreover, in systems
that present polarized motion (chemotaxis), depending
on the concentration of cooperators a gradient of nutri-
ents may be present and both cooperators and defectors
can migrate towards (away) high cooperator (defector)
density regions. Thus, a possible rule in this case can be:
“cooperators attract–defectors repell”, but many others
can be devised. Such non random rules may also de-
velop cooperative swarming, relevant for evolving higher
levels of biological organization, and is already found to
occur in bacteria [54]. Also interesting is the effect of
these more complex dynamical rules as well as the conse-
quences of random mobility in other regions of the strat-
egy space, in particular, when involving TIT-FOR-TAT
players.
The mobility m is an intrinsic parameter that indi-
cates the individual capability of performing walks (with
unitary step). As so, data for the same density ρ but
different mobilities m can be directly compared in figs. 3
and 5, and this information is summarized in fig. 4. How-
ever, this parameter alone is not a measure of the effec-
tive dispersal since, as the density increases, movements
are prevented by the lack of empty space. Unfortunately
there is not a general prescription for this effective dis-
persal and an actual measure would be necessary. This
is an important point, that will be addressed in a forth-
coming publication along with the question of how the
diffusivity of individuals change, for a given m and ρ,
when changing the displacement rule from the random
case considered here to a more biased choice? Even for
the simple unbiased case of this work some preliminary
results indicate that the effective mobility is not a sim-
ple function of these parameters as the dynamics may
become very slow, due both to the presence of defects
or critical slowing down, analogous to those observed in
glassy systems and close to a continuous transition, re-
spectively.
The PD is not the only possible framework in which
social dilemmas can be studied. For example, the snow-
drift game [6, 48], where P < S (while P > S in the
PD), is also biologically relevant and may lead to persis-
tent cooperative behavior. The payoff matrix considers
that cooperation involves a benefit b to those involved
and a cost c to the performer, while defection involves
no costs or benefits. When both cooperate, they receive
R = b − c/2, sharing the cost, while if they both defect
they receive P = 0. When one cooperates and the other
defects, the later receives T = b while the former is pe-
nalized with the total cost S = b− c. Although b > c > 0
and P < S, if we allow higher costs, b < c < 2b, we have
P > S, recovering the PD ranking. Interestingly, when
taking the spatial structure into account in the snowdrift
game, the amount of cooperation may be reduced, de-
pending on the cost to benefit ratio c/(2b − c) [25]. It
would be interesting to extend our results and study the
effects of dilution and mobility in the snowdrift game, and
different updating rules, stochastic or deterministic, syn-
chronous or not, as well. The parametrization considered
in our work, proposed in the original work of Nowak and
May [42], is at the borderline between these two games
as it considers b = c. There are, however, other possible
one-parameter matrixes, still keeping the ranking of the
PD game, for example, T = 1 + r, R = 1, P = 0 and
S = −r, with r = c/(b− c).
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